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NOTE

Coca Leaves and Colorado: International Law
and the Shifting Landscape of Drug Reform
CODY T. MASON†
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the international community committed itself to ending
the production, transportation, and use of narcotic drugs.1 In doing so,
the adopted Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs stated “addiction
to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is
fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,” and called on
all nations to act on their “duty to prevent and combat this evil.”2
Accordingly, the treaty required all member states to enforce a
general prohibition against narcotic drugs, other than for limited
exceptions,3 including through criminal penalties.4 The treaty ushered
in a wave of national anti-drug policies across the world and
continues to serve as the foundation of modern drug prohibition
policies.5
Although over 50 years have passed, and far-reaching
international cooperation has followed, the success, costs, and effects
of international drug prohibition remain highly dubious. The United
Nations estimated that the international rate of illicit drug use during
†

J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. The author would like to thank Martha Hanna for her patience; his family for
their support; Professor Michael Van Alstine for his guidance; and the Maryland
Journal of International Law for their tirelessness.
1. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 2, ¶ 5, opened for signature Jan.
24, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964).
2. Id. at 204. The Single Convention recognizes the medical and scientific
benefits associated with certain narcotics, and includes limited exceptions for such
use. Id.
3. For example, the treaty includes exceptions for medicinal drugs carried on
ships and aircraft engaged in international traffic. Id. at art. 32.
4. Id. at art. 36.
5. Allyn L. Taylor, Addressing the Global Tragedy of Needless Pain:
Rethinking the United Nations Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 556, 560 (2007).
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the 1990s was 3.3 to 4.1 percent.6 Over a decade later, it found that
3.6 to 6.9 percent of people ages 15 to 64 had used illicit drugs in
2011.7 Between 1998 and 2012, the amount of opium poppy
cultivated per year remained relatively stagnant.8 Similarly, the illicit
cultivation of coca brush decreased by less than ten percent between
2002 and 2011,9 despite extensive eradication efforts in source
countries such as Colombia.10 In addition, from the 1980s to 2007,
the price of many drugs, including powder cocaine, crack cocaine,
and heroin, fell, while purity remained constant or increased.11
Equally disconcerting are the substantial costs incurred by
implementing this policy, as evidenced by North America’s
experiences in enforcing prohibition. The United States alone spends
over $25 billion per year to combat narcotic drugs,12 while some
economists estimate that the total annual cost, on the federal and state
levels, is closer to $41 billion.13 Moreover, the costs of prohibition
are hardly limited to financial expenditures. In 2012, there were over
1.5 million drug abuse arrests in the United States, with over forty
percent based on possession of marijuana.14 Between 2006 and 2012,

6. U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, GLOBAL ILLICIT
DRUG TRENDS, at 116, U.N. SALES NO. E.99.XI.16 (1999).
7. U.N OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2013, AT 1, U.N.
SALES NO. E.13.XI.6 (2013).
8. Id. at Annex II, at xi.
9. Id. at Annex II, at xiii.
10. Michell L. Dion & Catherine Russler, Eradication Efforts, the State,
Displacement and Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan
Colombia, 40 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 399, 400–01 (2005); see also Guy R. Knudsen,
War is Peace: How Language Begets Power and Helps to Skirt International Law
in U.S. Efforts to Eradicate Colombian Coca Crops Using Chemical and Biological
Agents, 6 CRIT. 55, 60–61 (2013) (discussing the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia,
involving mass coca eradication through the use of aerial herbicides).
11. ARTHUR FRIES ET AL., INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, THE PRICE AND PURITY
OF ILLICIT DRUGS: 1981–2007, 9–11 (2008).
12. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
BUDGET: FY 2013 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS, 1 (2012), available at
http://www.whiteho
use.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/fy_2013_budget_highlights.pdf.
13. JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, CATO INST., THE
BUDGETARY IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION, 1 (2010), available at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DrugProhibitionWP.pdf.
14. Crime in the United States 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/persons-arrested/persons-arrested (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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over 60,000 Mexicans were killed in drug violence.15 Mexico’s
military response to that violence, which has been marred with
accusations of human rights abuses,16 has been subsidized by the
United States.17
Considering the complicated and troubled history of drug
prohibition, it is not surprising that some countries, states, and cities
have debated and adopted forms of drug decriminalization,
regulation, and legalization. But while these policy changes may be
justified by shifting circumstances and experience, international law
remains unmoved. Despite a growing wave of drug reform, the Single
Convention remains the cornerstone of international prohibitionfocused drug policy.
As such, this paper will explore the status of international drug
laws, the reforms taking place across the world, and the ability of
these competing movements to exist together. Part I looks at the
history and components of the Single Convention.18 Part II discusses
the enforcement of the Single Convention, with particular attention
paid to Bolivia’s successful attempt to create a reservation for coca
leaf chewing.19 Part III outlines some of the most important current
drug reform efforts, specifically in Uruguay and the American states
of Colorado and Washington.20 Part IV looks at possible future
legalization regulations and draws on evidence and recent
developments to conclude that the modern drug reform movement is
likely to continue and is incompatible with the Single Convention.21
The culmination of this paper’s findings is that those interested in
maintaining the validity of the Single Convention should favor a new
protocol or reservation or amendment procedure allowing for limited
legalization efforts for certain substances, such as marijuana.

15. MEXICO’S DISAPPEARED: THE ENDURING COST OF A CRISIS IGNORED,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/mexico0213_FoUpload_0_0_0.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Merida Initiative, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
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I. THE ROAD TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
A.

Early International Efforts to Regulate Narcotics

The first international treaty regulating narcotic drugs was the
1912 Hague International Opium Convention.22 Although initially
signed by representatives from only a handful of countries, it gained
near-universal adherence after it was incorporated into the Treaties of
Versailles, which ended World War I.23 The Convention, among
other provisions, required the parties to enact “effective laws or
regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw
opium,”24 limit the number of areas for the import and export of raw
opium,25 prevent the export of raw opium to countries which
prohibited it,26 and to clearly mark all exported opium as such.27 It
also called for measures leading to the “gradual and efficacious
suppression” of the manufacture, internal trade, and use of prepared
opium.28 The Convention also contained provisions limiting the
export and import of cocaine and morphine for medicinal purposes.29
The 1912 agreement was followed by a second international
convention signed in Geneva in 1925.30 Like its predecessor, this
convention dealt with the regulation of narcotic drugs, including
opium, cocaine, and morphine.31 However, the 1925 agreement also
introduced regulations of cannabis, which the convention referred to
as “Indian hemp.”32 The 1925 agreement, which was ratified by 55
nations, was in turn followed by the 1931 Convention for Limiting
the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotics Drugs.
22. U.N. Director General/Executive Director of Office on Drugs & Crime,
Opening Remarks on the Event to Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the
Signing of the 1912 International Opium Convention, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/speeches/2012/1912-international-opium-convention.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2014). See generally Norman Ansley, International Efforts to Control Narcotics,
50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1959) (discussing earlier largely bilateral
treaties affecting the production and trade of narcotic drugs).
23. The 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS
& CRIME (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/the-1912hague-international-opium-convention.html.
24. International Opium Convention art. 1, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912 (1912).
25. Id. at art. 2, at 1930.
26. Id. at art. 3.
27. Id. at art. 4, at 1931.
28. Id. at art. 6.
29. Id. at art. 10, at 1932.
30. International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 231.
31. Id. at art. 4, at 329.
32. Id. at art. 1.
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That convention called on its 64 member states and assorted
territories to create a “special administration” to effectuate the treaty,
regulate and control the drug trade, and combat drug addiction.33 It
also divided narcotic substances into groups, or schedules, based on
their addictive propensity.34
In 1936, a new treaty, the Convention for the Suppression of the
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, signaled a shift in the international
focus toward imprisonment and penal enforcement. The treaty,
commonly known as the 1936 Trafficking Convention, obligated
each of the 36 member states to create provisions “severely
punishing, particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of
deprivation of liberty,” among other things, the manufacture,
preparation, possession, distribution, purchase, transport and export
of narcotic drugs.35 Although the Convention faced limited initial
acceptance, it paved the way for the modern approach to drug policy
by creating the first international drug crime offenses.36
After World War II, the United Nations took responsibility for
enforcing the international drug treaties from the League of Nations37
through the creation of the Lake Success Protocol of 1947.38 The
scope of international control was then expanded a year later under
the Paris Protocol to cover thirty previously unregulated synthetic
drugs.39 In 1953, the number of conventions continued to increase
with the introduction of the New York Opium Protocol, which
limited the import and export of opium to that produced in seven
specific countries.40

33. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution
of Narcotic Drugs, art. 15, July 13, 1931, 139 L.N.T.S. 303 (1931).
34. David Bewley-Taylor & Martin Jelsma, Regime Change: Re-visiting the
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 23 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 72, 74 (2012).
35. Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs
art. 2, June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 300.
36. Chronology: 100 Years of Drug Control, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON
DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/timeline_E
_PRINT.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
37. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 74.
38. Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on
Narcotic Drugs art. II, ¶ 2, Dec. 11, 1946, 12 U.N.T.S. 179.
39. Ansley, supra note 22, at 109.
40. Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant,
the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, June
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B. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Modern Reforms
While the intention of the new UN treaties was to broaden and
update the scope of the previous international drug agreements, they
were adopted at a time when a parallel effort was underway to
simplify the array of conventions that had been “developing
piecemeal since 1912.”41 The result of those efforts was the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which terminated the previous drug
control conventions42 by merging them into a single uniform
document.43 As noted by the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB), the purposes of the Single Convention were to codify the
existing drug control treaties and to extend their reach to include “the
cultivation of plants that were grown as the raw material of narcotic
drugs.” 44 As such, it was meant to deter drug trafficking and “limit
the possession, use, trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture
and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes.”45
The Single Convention set limits on the amount of drugs that
could be manufactured and imported,46 called for the prohibition of
narcotic drug cultivation where possible,47 imposed restrictions on
the manufacture of narcotics,48 and prohibited “the possession of
drugs except under legal authority,” such as for medical purposes.49
In addition, the Single Convention created four schedules of drugs, to
determine which narcotics would be subject to which restrictions.50 In
order to promote compliance with and implementation of the various
provisions, the Single Convention created the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs and the INCB.51

23, 1953, 456 U.N.T.S. 35. The seven countries were Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran,
Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Id. art. XV, at 38.
41. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 74.
42. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, art. 44, at 258–59.
43. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 6, at 103.
44. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL
BD.,
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/narcotic-drugs/1961_Convention.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2013).
45. Id.
46. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, art. 21, at 230.
47. Id. at art. 22, at 232.
48. Id. at art. 29, at 240.
49. Id. at art. 33, at 248.
50. Id. at art. 2, at 208, 210.
51. Id. at art. 5, at 216. These offices are discussed infra Part II.
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The Single Convention was amended in 1972, but no dramatic
changes have been made to its scope or operation.52 Rather, instead
of adjusting the Single Convention to account for changing cultural
norms and research, the international community has created similar,
parallel agreements. For example, in 1976, the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances entered into force.53 This new treaty, while
independent of the Single Convention, was modeled after that earlier
agreement’s format and scheduling system.54 The purpose was to
expand the list of substances covered by international law to include
psychotropic drugs, such as LSD, psilocybin, amphetamines, and
PCP.55 Similar approaches were also taken with the 1988 Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances,56 which expanded regulation to drug precursors,57 and
the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,58 which
addressed issues of drug trafficking, as well as broader areas of
terrorism and crime.59
Although these later conventions expanded the reach of
international drug laws, the Single Convention remains the
cornerstone of modern drug policy.60 The institutions and principles it
put in place continue to influence policymakers throughout the world,
and 184 states are currently members to the agreement.61 However, as
52. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 78.
53. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Jan. 11,
1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976).
54. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 79.
55. Id.
56. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force Nov. 11, 1990).
57. Legal Framework for Drug Trafficking, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/legal-framework.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2013).
58. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted Nov. 15, 2000, 2255 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003).
59. G.A. Res. 55/25, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
60. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 6, at 103.
61. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by the Protocol
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Aug. 8, 1975, 976
U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Single Convention as Amended]. A running list of
signatories is found on the UN website. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961, as Amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/

2014]

COCA LEAVES AND COLORADO

245

explained below, the Single Convention provides for extremely
limited substantive enforcement options, and member states’
compliance has been uneven in many ways.
II.

ENFORCING THE SINGLE CONVENTION

A.

Enforcement Agencies

Several international organizations are charged with
implementing, supervising, and enforcing compliance with the Single
Convention,62 but two stand out in particular. First, the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is charged with
assisting member states “in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime
and terrorism.”63 To do this, the UNODC performs research,
organizes campaigns, attempts to increase the capacity of states to
counteract illicit drugs, and helps states implement the treaty through
the development of domestic policies and legislation.64 The
governing body for the UNODC is the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs, which is responsible for “supervising the application of
international drug control treaties”65 and was created by the Single
Convention.66 The Commission is also charged with amending the
drug schedules and making recommendations for implementing the
Single Convention.67
The second international agency, which is more involved than
UNDOC in actual enforcement, is the quasi-judicial body known as
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The INCB was
created by the Single Convention to work with governments “to limit
the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an
adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes.”68
Despite this role, the INCB does not have any police powers at its
disposal to enforce the Single Convention.69

Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&lang=en,
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
62. Taylor, supra note 5, at 560–61.
63. About UNODC, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop (last viewed Nov. 10, 2013).
64. Id.
65. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/commissions/CND/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
66. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 5, at 216.
67. Id. at art. 8, at 218.
68. Single Convention as Amended, supra note 61, at art. 9, ¶ 4, at 112.
69. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 75.
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However, the INCB does have the ability to recommend that the
member states stop the import or export of drugs, including those for
purely medical purposes, from or to a violating country.70 Such a
recommendation is not appealable to a higher body,71 but can only
occur if the INCB objectively believes that the Single Convention’s
aims are being “seriously endangered” and if it is satisfied that the
embargo is “necessary” to prevent that endangerment.72 Moreover,
the Secretary General’s comments to the Single Convention stress
that the initiation of a procedure to examine whether a state has failed
to adhere to the Single Convention is “a serious and very delicate
matter,” particularly for the reason that it could lead to an embargo.73
The INCB has never recommended a drug embargo.74
Instead, the INCB has relied on pressure politics to influence
countries that are violating, or seem likely to violate, the Single
Convention. This involves a “name and shame” process that is
implicitly supported by the possibility of an embargo.75 For example,
in its 2012 report the INCB noted that the famous “coffee shops” that
sell marijuana in the Netherlands “are in violation of the provisions
of the international drug control conventions.”76 This was true despite
planned reforms, including limiting access to residents of the
Netherlands aged 18 years or older and limiting the number of annual
members per shop.77
As will be discussed below, the INCB’s response to the
marijuana “coffee shops” is typical of its approach to regulatory
models that employ even limited drug legalization, even if, as in the

70. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 14, at 224.
71. INT’L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL BOARD: CURRENT TENSIONS AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 3 (2008),
available at http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/IDPC_BP_07.pdf.
72. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1 at art. 14, at 224.
73. U.N. SEC’Y-GEN., COMMENTARY ON THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, at 178, U.N. Sales No. E.73.XI.1 (1973).
74. INT’L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, supra note 71, at 3.
75. Id.
76. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2012, at 100, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2012/1, U.N.
Sales No. E.13.XI.1 (2012).
77. Id.
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Netherlands, that legalization is largely de facto.78 In contrast, the
INCB has been generally indifferent toward possessory
decriminalization measures and some medical programs. For
example, the INCB sent a mission to Portugal in June 2012 and found
that the government was “fully committed to the objectives” of the
international drug control conventions,79 even though Portugal
decriminalized possession of certain amounts of all drugs in 2001.80
Such levity is in line with the Single Convention’s emphasis on
allowing narcotics to be used for medical purposes, as well as
comments to the Single Convention stating that the treaty need not
necessarily apply to simple possession for personal use.81 However,
these “exceptions” are very narrow and can often appear
inconsistent.82 Moreover, they are completely inapplicable when
member states bypass decriminalization in favor of drug
legalization.83

78. See Toleration Policy Regarding Soft Drugs and Coffee Shops, GOV’T OF
NETHERLANDS, http://www.government.nl/issues/drugs/toleration-policy-regarding
-soft-drugs-and-coffee-shops (last visited Feb. 26, 2013) (explaining that marijuana
is technically illegal in the Netherlands, but its use and sale from regulated “coffee
shops” is officially “tolerated”).
79. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 76, at 16.
80. Wiebke Hollersen, ‘This is Working’: Portugal, 12 Years After
Decriminalizing Drugs, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/inter
national/europe/evaluating-drug-decriminalization-in-portugal-12-years-later-a891060.html. For example, someone may possess one gram of heroin, two grams of
cocaine, 25 grams of marijuana, 5 grams of hashish, or one gram of MDMA
without legal repercussions. Id.
81. U.N. SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 73, at 402.
82. For example, in its 2012 report, the INCB stated that the “control
requirements” in place in every American state that has medicinal marijuana “fall
short” or the requirements within the Convention. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD.,
supra note 76, at 66. It also stated that providing “drug injection rooms” for
addicts, as done in Vancouver, is contrary to the Convention unless “limited
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes.” Id. at 10. In its 2013 report, the
INCB stated that the “widely commercialized ‘medical’ cannabis” program in
Colorado was “poorly implemented and not in conformity with the 1961
Convention….” INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2013, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2013/1, U.N.
Sales No. E.14.XI.1 (2014).
83. See INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 76, at 36 (“The Board
wishes to point out that such an initiative, if it were to be implemented, would be
contrary to the provisions of the international drug control conventions.”).
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B. Enforcing International Law in Bolivia
1. Coca Leaves and the Single Convention
Indigenous populations in Bolivia and other Andean countries
have been chewing coca leaves since roughly 3000 B.C.84 This
practice can be traced back to traditional shamanistic rituals,85 but
coca leaves are chewed for numerous reasons. For example, it has
been used to combat the effects of the cold, thin Andean air;86 reduce
hunger, cold, fatigue, and pain;87 and boost energy.88 However,
despite this history, the Single Convention states that “[c]oca leaf
chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming
into force of this Convention.”89 Bolivia failed to create a reservation
to this provision90 when it acceded to the Single Convention in 1976,
and was thus bound to enforce the prohibition by 2001.91
This deadline was never fully met, and the INCB has criticized
the failure of the Bolivian government to successfully enforce the
prohibition against coca leaf production and use for years.92 For
example, the INCB’s 1980 report stated that, “[a]lmost all of the
cocaine abused in the United States is derived from coca leaf

84. Larry W. Cartmell et al., The Frequency and Antiquity of Prehistoric CocaLeaf-Chewing Practices in Northern Chile: Radioimmunoassay of a Cocaine
Metabolite in Human-Mummy Hair, 2 LATIN AM. ANTIQUITY 260, 265 (1991).
85. Richard T. Martin, The Role of Coca in the History, Religion, and
Medicine of South American Indians, 24 ECON. BOTANY 422, 424 (1970).
86. American Society of International Law, Bolivia Rejoins Narcotics
Convention with Reservation Protecting Coca Leaf over U.S. and Others’
Objections, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 461 (John R. Crook ed., 2013).
87. Robert B. South, Coca in Bolivia, 67 GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 22, 22
(1977).
88. Id. at 23.
89. Single Convention, supra note 1 at art. 49, at 264.
90. Press Release, Department of Public Information, Press Conference on
Bolivia’s Proposed Amendment to 1961 Narcotics Drugs Convention, U.N. Press
Release (June 24, 2011) [hereinafter Press Conference on Bolivia’s Proposed
Amendment].
91. Evo Morales Ayma, Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/opinion/14morales.html.
92. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2011, at v, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2011/1, U.N.
Sales No. E.12.XI.5 (2012).
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produced illicitly in Peru and Bolivia.”93 In 1996, the INCB noted
that coca bush eradication in Bolivia had declined,94 and in 2004 it
voiced concerns over Bolivia’s political commitment to successful
enforcement.95 In 2009, the INCB urged the Bolivian government to
adopt more effective policies and to take a more “proactive role” in
addressing coca leaf cultivation and drug trafficking.96 A year later,
the INCB noted with “regret” that Bolivia had made no progress in
implementing suggested reforms.97 Although these repeated warnings
might appear identical to the regular recriminations given to countries
such as the Netherlands, Bolivia’s general lack of enforcement in
regard to coca leaves forebode a more serious confrontation with the
Single Convention and the INCB.
2.

An Attempt to Amend

In 2005, Bolivians elected the socialist presidential candidate
Evo Morales into office.98 Morales’ landslide win was historic in that
he became the country’s first indigenous president.99 Although the
majority of the population is indigenous,100 the country has
traditionally been ruled over by Bolivians of Hispanic descent.101
Morales’s ethnicity, combined with his left-wing ideology and
friendship with then-president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez portended

93. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 1980, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/51, U.N. Sales
No. E.81.XI.2 (1980).
94. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 1996, at 45, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/1996/1 (1996).
95. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2004, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2004/1, U.N.
Sales No. E.05.XI.3 (2005).
96. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2009, at 32, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2009/1, U.N.
Sales No. E.10.XI.1 (2010).
97. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2010, at 23, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2010/1, U.N.
Sales No. E.11.XI.1 (2011).
98. Juan Forero, Coco Advocate Wins Election for President in Bolivia, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/international/americas/
19bolivia.html?_r=0.
99. Rory Carroll, Evo Morales Wins Landslide Victory in Bolivian Presidential
Elections, GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/
07/morales-presidential-victory.
100. Id.
101. Bolivia Profile, BBC, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-18727507.
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significant changes both domestically and abroad,102 but another
aspect of Morales’ resume posed a different issue for the international
community. Namely, Morales is a former coca leaf farmer and has
chaired Bolivia’s coca leaf growers union since 1996.103 He was reelected to that post as recently as the summer of 2012.104
Morales’ background, combined with Bolivia’s failure to
effectively implement the prohibition of coca leaf chewing by 2001,
set the stage for the Bolivian government’s attempts to reshape its
role in relation to the Single Convention. In 2006, President Morales
called on the UN General Assembly to remove coca leaves from
international control.105 In 2007, the Bolivian government requested
that the World Health Organization begin a process of evaluating and
validating the medicinal properties of coca leaves.106 The following
year, President Morales reiterated his view that coca leaves should
not be under international control in a letter to the UN SecretaryGeneral.107
More dramatically, in 2009, Bolivia approved a new constitution
requiring the state to “protect native and ancestral coca” and
emphatically stating that the coca leaf “is not a narcotic.”108 The new
constitution also provided that the “revaluation, production, sale and
industrialization of coca shall be governed by law.”109 Morales was a
strong supporter of the new constitution, which also increased
indigenous rights and loosened presidential term limits, and
reportedly wept for joy when a draft version was agreed to in 2008.110

102. A Champion of Indigineous Rights—and of State Control of the Economy,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/5300873.
103. Ryan Villarreal, Why Bolivian President Morales Still Heads Coca
Growers Union, INT’L BUS. TIMES, July 10, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/whybolivian-president-morales-still-heads-coca-growers-union-722548.
104. Bolivia’s Evo Morales Re-elected Coca Growers’ Leader, BBC NEWS,
July 9, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18768929.
105. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 93, at 36.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 36–37.
108. NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Oct. 2008, art. 384 (Bol.).
109. Id.
110. Matthew Taylor, Evo Morales Hails ‘New Bolivia’ as Constitution Is
Approved, GUARDIAN, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/
26/bolivia.
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The new constitution and its coca leaf provision were followed
by a direct assault on the Single Convention. Specifically, Morales
introduced a treaty amendment that would remove coca leaves from
the list of prohibited narcotic drugs by deleting Article 49,
Paragraphs 1(c)111 and 2(e)112 from the Single Convention.113 In a
New York Times op-ed, Morales argued that the initial classification
was a mistake that ignored the history, benefits, and lack of negative
side effects of coca leaf chewing.114
Under Article 47 of the Single Convention, any party may
propose an amendment to the treaty, which must then be circulated to
the relevant international bodies and the other member states.115 An
amendment will enter into effect if no objections are raised in the 18
months after its circulation.116 If a single party rejects the
amendment, the Economic and Social Council has the option of
calling a convention to consider the proposed change.117 In the case
of Bolivia’s proposed amendment, the deadline for member states to
lodge an objection was January 31, 2011.118 Three countries – the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden – rejected the
proposed amendment before the deadline passed.119 Those objections
sunk President Morales’ attempt to amend the Single Convention and
ultimately shifted Bolivia’s efforts toward a far less orthodox
approach.
3.

Denunciations, Reservations, and Re-Adherences

On June 24, 2011, the Bolivian Ambassador to the United
Nations Pablo Solón announced that Bolivia would “denounce” the

111. “A Party may at the time of signature, ratification or accession reserve the
right to permit temporarily in any one of its territories: … (c) Coca leaf chewing.”
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 49.
112. “The reservations under paragraph 1 shall be subject to the following
restrictions: … (e) Coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years
from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of article
41.” Id.
President of Bolivia, Letter dated Mar. 12, 2009 from the President of Bolivia
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2009/78 (May 15, 2009) (Enclosure).
114. Morales Ayma, supra note 91.
115. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 47.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. U.N. Dep’t Pub. Info, Press Conference by Bolivia on Amendment to
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/
briefings/docs/2011/110128_Bolivia.doc.htm.
119. Id.
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Single Convention.120 Having been unable to amend the Single
Convention, Bolivia turned to leaving the agreement in order to readhere with a reservation protecting the historical right to chew coca
leaves.121 Solón stated that Bolivia’s withdrawal and re-adherence to
the Single Convention would both occur on January 1, 2012, and that
the country’s legislature was already in the process of approving the
necessary legislation.122 Moreover, he assured the international
community that Bolivia would remain in compliance with the rest of
the treaty pending re-adherence.123 If less than one-third of the
member states—61—objected to the re-adherence in the 12 months
following its withdrawal, Bolivia would rejoin the Single
Convention.124
After formally withdrawing from the Single Convention,
President Morales continued to push the United Nations to amend the
treaty to exempt the chewing of raw coca leaves.125 This was
unsuccessful, and Bolivia ultimately faced resistance to its readherence plan. For example, in its 2011 report, the INCB noted that
while Bolivia’s “unprecedented” denunciation “may be technically
permitted under the Convention, it is contrary to the fundamental
object and spirit of the Convention.”126 Moreover, the INCB warned
that allowing such a move to succeed would undermine the integrity
of the drug control system and would compromise “the achievements
of the past 100 years in drug control.”127 The INCB, however, did not
threaten a drug embargo.128 Bolivia’s proposed re-adherence was also
formally opposed by several influential countries, including the

120. Press Conference on Bolivia’s Proposed Amendment, supra note 90.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. U.N. Office of Drugs & Crime, Bolivia to Re-accede to UN Drug
Convention, while Making Exception on Coca Leaf Chewing (last visited Apr. 1,
2014),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/January/bolivia-to-reaccede-to-un-drug-convention-while-making-exception-on-coca-leaf-chewing.html
[hereinafter Bolivia to Re-accede].
125. Marilla Brocchetto, Bolivia’s Morales to UN: Legalize Coca-Leaf
Chewing, CNN (Mar. 13, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/13/world
/americas/bolivia-morales-coca/.
126. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 92, at v.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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United States and the other members of the G8. 129 However, only 15
countries130 ended up formally objecting—far short of 61 required to
block re-adherence—allowing Bolivia to become a member to the
Single Convention, with its new reservation,131 effective February 10,
2013.132
III. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION
Bolivia’s challenge to the Single Convention was a clear loss for
the INCB and traditional drug control mechanisms. Although Bolivia
failed to amend the Single Convention, it successfully withdrew and
re-adhered with a reservation, despite the INCB’s dire warnings133
and the unequivocal language of the Single Convention. It is too soon
to know the full effects of Bolivia’s re-adherence strategy, but it has
set the stage for further conflicts between individual states and the
INCB. In fact, significant challenges arose soon after Bolivia’s readherence, in the form of marijuana legalization initiatives recently
enacted in Uruguay and the American states of Colorado and
Washington.
A.

Legalization Programs

The programs pursued by Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington
differ in their scope and execution but will result in the same
outcome: the legalization and regulation of recreational marijuana
possession and sales.
1.

Marijuana Legalization in Uruguay

129. Press Release, Washington Office on Latin Am., Bolivia Wins a Rightful
Victory on the Coca Leaf (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.wola.org/news/
bolivia_wins_a_rightful_victory_on_the_coca_leaf.
130. Id. The 15 countries objecting to re-adherence were: Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
131. The reservation states:
The Plurinational State of Bolivia reserves the right to allow in its
territory: traditional coca leaf chewing; the consumption and use of the
coca leaf in its natural state for cultural and medicinal purposes, such as its
use in infusions; and also the cultivation, trade and possession of the coca
leaf to the extent necessary for these licit purposes. At the same time, the
Plurinational State of Bolivia will continue to take all necessary measures
to control the cultivation of coca in order to prevent its abuse and the illicit
production of the narcotic drugs which may be extracted from the leaf.
Single Convention as Amended, supra note 61.
132. Bolivia to Re-accede, supra note 124.
133. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 92, at v.
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Uruguay is a small South American state that became the first
country since the adoption of the modern drug control model to
legalize recreational marijuana.134 Despite the country officially
acceding to the Single Convention in 1975135 and signs of opposition
among the public,136 Uruguay’s lower house passed a bill in the
summer of 2013 to legalize and regulate the production, distribution,
and sale of marijuana.137 The closely divided vote sent the bill to the
senate, which passed the measure on December 10, 2013.138 The
President of Uruguay José Mujica signed it into law 13 days later.139
Marijuana use has been decriminalized in Uruguay since the
1970s,140 but the recent measure furthered this move away from the
penal approach by allowing marijuana to be sold in pharmacies.141
Purchases of marijuana will be limited to locals142 that are 18 years or

134. Hannah Hetzer, Finally, a Nation Legalizes Pot, CNN (Dec. 11, 2013,
6:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/10/opinion/hetzer-uruguay-legalizesmarijuana/.
135. Single Convention as Amended, supra note 61.
136. At least one poll put support for legalization at 26 percent, with 64
percent opposed. El Proyecto de Ley Para Regular El Cultivo y Consumo de
Marihuana, GONZÁLEZ RAGA & ASOCIADOS (Dec. 2012), http://www.cifra.com.uy
/novedades.php?idNoticia=182; Geoffrey Ramsey, Uruguay’s Marijuana Bill
Faces Political, Economic Obstacles, In Sight Crime (July 25, 2013),
http://www.insightcrime.org/uruguay-legalization-drugs/uruguay-marijuana-billfaces-political-economic-obstacles.
137. Eloisa Capurro et al., Uruguay’s Lower House Votes to Legalize
Marijuana, CNN, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/world/americas/
uruguay-marijuana-legalization/index.html.
138. Nick Miroff, Uruguay Votes to Legalize Marijuana, WASH. POST, Dec.
11, 2013, at A11.
139. Steven Nelson, Uruguay’s President Quietly Signs Marijuana
Legalization Bill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 26, 2013,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/26/uruguays-president-quietlysigns-marijuana-legalization-bill.
140. Juan Forero, Growers Celebrate as Uruguay Prepares to Legalize
Marijuana Cultivation, Distribution, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pot-growers-celebrate-as-uruguaylegalizes-cultivation-and-consumption-of-marijuana/2013/10/23/f8044fc6-3bfe11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html.
141. Id.
142. Tony Grands, Blaze Up: Uruguay Becomes the World’s First Country to
Legalize Marijuana, URBAN DAILY (Dec. 11, 2013), http://theurbandaily.com/2013
/12/11/uruguay-legalized-marijuana/.
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older, and to 40 grams per month.143 Citizens can also grow up to six
marijuana plants at home and form smoking clubs allowed to produce
up to 99 plants per year.144 The government will control the
psychoactive level of the marijuana sold by testing and limiting the
tetrahydrocannabinal (THC) levels of all plants.145 In addition, the
government will advise consumers on the best ways to consume
marijuana and will create a confidential registry of those who
purchase the drug.146 Cultivation and production, while regulated,
will be left to private enterprises.147
President Mujica’s stated purpose in signing the bill was to
eliminate the illegal trade in marijuana by creating a regulated market
that will sell marijuana at a fixed, lower price.148 Uruguay’s drug czar
stated, prior to passage, that marijuana sales would begin in the
second half of 2014 at a price of one dollar per gram.149 Official
guidance issued since passage has suggested a lower price of between
87 cents and one dollar per gram.150 The government says that
marijuana is the most commonly used illegal substance in Uruguay
and that drug traffickers earn $30 to $40 million per year from the
marijuana market.151
2.

Marijuana Legalization in Colorado and Washington

The United States is not a stranger to marijuana reform, despite
its role as a primary supporter of the modern approach to drug
143. Rafael Romo, New Rules in Uruguay Create a Legal Marijuana Market,
CNN, May 6, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/06/world/americas/uruguaymarijuana-rules/.
144. Miroff, supra note 138.
145. Uki Goni, Uruguay Sets Price of Legalised Cannabis at $1 a Gram,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/
22/uruguay-legal-cannabis-1-dollar-gram.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Capurro et al., supra note 137. There is some evidence that the illegal
trade may already be suffering thanks to American legalization programs. Nick
Miroff, Tracing the U.S. Heroin Surge Back South of the Border as Mexican
Cannabis Output Falls, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/tracing-the-us-heroin-surge-back-south-of-the-border-as-mexicancannabis-output-falls/2014/04/06/58dfc590-2123-4cc6-b6641e5948960576_story.html.
149. Goni, supra note 145.
150. Malena Castaldi, Uruguay Says Legal Marijuana to Be Good and Cheap,
REUTERS, May 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/us-uruguaymarijuana-idUSBREA460JR20140507.
151. Capurro et al., supra note 137.
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prohibition. As of June 2014, 22 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted varying medical marijuana programs.152 19 states have
decriminalized the possession of certain amounts of marijuana under
particular circumstances,153 and the District of Columbia, barring
federal action, will soon follow suit.154 According to the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, these
decriminalization policies typically treat the first-time possession of
small amounts of marijuana for personal use like “a minor traffic
ticket,” in that punishment does not involve prison time or a criminal
record.155 Although these approaches have become relatively
widespread in recent years, the states of Colorado and Washington

152. State Policy, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/
(last visited June 23, 2014). The states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. New York will become
the 23rd state with a medical marijuana program if, as expected, Governor Andrew
Cuomo signs a medical marijuana bill passed by the state legislature in June 2014.
Jesse McKinley, New York Senate Passes Bill on Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/nyregion/new-york-senatepasses-bill-on-medical-marijuana.html?_r=0. In addition, some states, such as
Florida and North Carolina, have approved or will likely approve medical programs
allowing for the use of marijuana oil. See Lisa Crivelli, Medical marijuana oil bills
approved in North Carolina, Florida, MSNBC, (June 19, 2014),
http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/medical-marijuana-oil-bills-approved-northcarolina-florida.
153. Id. The states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington.
154. Eyder Peralta, D.C. Mayor Signs Bill Decriminalizing Some Marijuana
Use, NPR, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/31/29733
9798/d-c-mayor-signs-bill-decriminalizing-some-marijuana-use. Mayor Vincent
Gray signed the decriminalization bill on March 31, 2014, but Congress has a 60day window in which it can block the law from coming into force. Id. At the time
of publication, it appeared likely that Congress would not block decriminalization
from going into effect. See Hannah Hess, Advocates Fired Up as D.C. Marijuana
Decriminalization Avoids Appropriations Rider, ROLL CALL, June 18, 2014,
http://blogs.rollcall.com/hill-blotter/advocates-fired-up-as-d-c-marijuanadecriminalization-avoids-appropriations-rider/?dcz=.
155. States That Have Decriminalized, NAT. ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF
MARIJUANA
LAWS,
http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-havedecriminalized (last visited June 23, 2014).
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made history in 2012 when voters in both states approved ballot
measures legalizing recreational marijuana.156
Colorado’s Amendment 64 changed the state constitution to
allow the use of marijuana for persons twenty-one years of age or
older and called for the marijuana market to be taxed and regulated
“in a manner similar to alcohol.”157 The amendment allows for the
possession, cultivation, and transportation of up to six marijuana
plants, the transfer of up to one ounce of marijuana without payment,
and the purchase of marijuana from licensed retail stores.158 It also
requires specific regulations on all aspects of the marijuana trade.159
Accordingly, in September 2013, Colorado became the first
American state to adopt rules for legal, recreational marijuana.160 The
Colorado Department of Revenue’s 134-page report on the accepted
provisions lays out every aspect of the state’s regulation of the
marijuana industry, from the testing of retail facilities to waste
disposal and advertising.161 Voters in Colorado further legitimized
the program when they approved a retail marijuana sales tax with
over 65 percent of the vote in 2013.162 The 15 percent tax is expected
to bring in $67 million per year, which will go toward the regulation
of retail marijuana stores, addressing the collateral impact of
marijuana legalization, and school construction.163 With the
156. Amendment 64 in Colorado was passed with roughly 55 percent of the
vote, while voters in Washington enacted Initiative 502 with approval by about 56
percent of that state’s vote. Marijuana Legalization on the Ballot (LIVE RESULTS),
HUFFINGTON
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/marijuanalegalization-results_n_2074168.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2012).
157. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Matt Ferner, Colorado First State in U.S. to Adopt Rules for Legal,
Recreational Marijuana, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2013, 7:08 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/colorado-first-state-rulesmarijuana_n_3902602.html.
161. COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT DIV., PERMANENT
RULES RELATED TO THE COLORADO RETAIL MARIJUANA CODE (Sept. 9, 2013),
available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=ap
plication%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=12518838470
85.
162. John Ingold, Colorado Voters Overwhelmingly Approve State Marijuana
Tax, DENVER POST, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_
24461038/colorado-voters-decide-how-heavily-tax-marijuana-sales.
163. Id. Colorado is reported to have brought in nearly $25 million in revenue
from the first three months of legalization. JC Sevcik, Colorado Generates over
$25M in Marijuana Revenue Since Legalization, UPI (May 9, 2014, 4:32 PM),
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regulations and taxes in place, the first recreational retail marijuana
shops opened on January 1, 2014.164
Similar to the Colorado amendment, the Washington initiative
legalizing marijuana requires taxation and regulation in a manner
“similar to that for controlling hard alcohol.”165 Furthermore, it
allows for the “production, possession, delivery, distribution, and sale
of marijuana” from specially licensed retailers and processors.166
Like its counterpart in Colorado, the initiative limits its provisions to
persons twenty-one years of age or older, and lays out specific
requirements for licensing, sales, and regulations.167 Individuals may
possess up to one ounce of useable marijuana without facing criminal
prosecution, and the state estimates that marijuana will cost roughly
12 dollars per gram.168 The new law imposes a 25 percent tax on all
sales.169
The initiative left licensing, core regulations, and the drafting of
rules to the Washington State Liquor Control Board, which approved
a set of proposed rules in September 2013.170 Among the rules were
limits on the amount of space available for cultivation, caps on the
total number of cultivated marijuana, as well as requirements for
labeling and child-resistant packaging.171 The rules took effect on
November 16, 2013,172 and the Liquor Control Board currently lists

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2014/05/09/Colorado-generates-over-25M-inmarijuana-revenue-since-legalization/1981399662232/.
164. Jack Healy, Up Early and in Line for a Marijuana Milestone in Colorado,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/us/colorado-storesthrow-open-their-doors-to-pot-buyers.html?hp&_r=0.
165. 2013 Wash. Sess. Laws 28.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., INITIATIVE 502’S IMPACT ON THE
WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD (NOV. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-502/Fact-Sheet-I-502-REVISED11-19-12.pdf.
169. Id.
170. Id. See Board Approves Filing of Proposed Rules to Implement Initiative
502, WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD. (Sept. 4, 2013), available at
http://liq.wa.gov/pressreleases/board_approves_filing_of_proposed_rules_to_imple
ment_initiative_502_sept_4%20.
171. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., supra note 168.
172. Id.
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334 retail marijuana outlets registered with the state.173 Commercial
sales, however, will likely not begin until July 2014.174
B.

The Single Convention versus Marijuana Legalization

Predictably, the developments in Uruguay and the United States
have not received a warm reception from proponents of the Single
Convention. In the case of Uruguay, the INCB warned prior to
passage that the legalization bill “would be in complete contravention
to the provisions of the international drug control treaties” and would
have “serious consequences for the health and welfare of the
population and for the prevention of cannabis abuse among the
young.”175 After passage, the INCB chastised Uruguay for
“knowingly decid[ing] to break the universally agreed and
internationally endorsed legal provisions of the treaty.”176
The U.S. State Department also cautioned Uruguay against
ignoring its international commitments,177 which serves to illustrate
the conflicted position of the United States in relation to the Single
Convention, considering the INCB has made similar comments in
regard to the legalization programs in Washington and Colorado.
Although less dramatic than its warnings to Uruguay, the INCB
voiced “grave concern” over the referenda and stressed that member
states have an obligation to “ensure their full compliance with the
conventions within their entire territory, including federated states
and/or provinces.”178 The INCB reiterated this point several months
later.179

173. Retail Store Locations, WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD.,
http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-502/I-502-Retail-Store-LocationsII-9-03-13.xlsx.
174. Rachel La Corte, Washington Prepares for Marijuana Retail Sales, THE
NEWS TRIBUNE, June 24, 2014, http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/06/24/32597
19/washington-prepares-for-marijuana.html?sp=/99/289/&ihp=1.
175. Press Release, Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., INCB President Urges
Uruguay to Remain Within the International Drug Control Treaties, Noting Draft
Cannabis Legislation (Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://incb.org/documents/
Publications/PressRelease/PR2013/press_release010813.pdf.
176. Press Release, Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., Uruguay is Breaking the
International Conventions on Drug Control with the Cannabis Legislation
Approved by its Congress (Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://www.incb.org/
documents/Publications/PressRelease/PR2013/press_release_111213.pdf.
177. Forero, supra note 140.
178. Press Release, Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., INCB President Voices
Concerns About the Outcome of Recent Referenda About Non-Medical Use of
Cannabis in the United States in a Number of States (Nov. 15, 2012), available at
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Despite this warning, some commentators have argued that the
Single Convention has no bearing on the actions of individual
American states, because they are not themselves parties to the
treaty.180 However, the INCB obviously does not agree with that
interpretation and has previously requested that the United States
“take effective measures to ensure the implementation of all control
measures for cannabis plants and cannabis” in response to existing
and possible medical marijuana and decriminalization laws.181
Moreover, the fact that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
announced in August 2013 that it would allow the Colorado and
Washington laws to go into effect without challenging them would
seem to seriously complicate any claim that the Single Convention
has not been implicated,182 and raises significant questions about the
federal government’s commitment to the treaty. Specifically, the DOJ
has stated that it will not sue Colorado or Washington, or attempt to
enforce marijuana prohibition in their territories, so long as eight
requirements are met, including preventing use by minors, keeping
marijuana out of interstate commerce, and stopping the sale of
http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/PressRelease/PR2012/press_release_1
51112.pdf.
179. Press Release, Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., INCB President Calls on the
United States Government to Address Initiatives Aimed at Permitting Recreational
Drug Use (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.incb.org/documents/Publication
s/PressRelease/PR2013/press_release140313.pdf (“[T]he United States has a treaty
obligation to ensure the implementation of the treaties on the entirety of its
territory.”).
180. See Jacob Sullum, An Anti-Drug Treaty Cannot Authorize the Feds to
Make States Ban Marijuana, REASON.COM (Nov. 23, 2012, 9:49 AM),
http://reason.com/blog/2012/11/23/a-treaty-cannot-authorize-the-feds-to-ma
(pointing out that the federal government cannot dictate state drug laws); see also
Keith Humphreys, Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?
HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 25, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nations-bl_b_3977683.html (noting that the United
States government, not the governments of the individual states, is a signatory to
the drug control treaty).
181. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 76, at 66. (“The Board notes
that the control requirements that have been adopted in the 17 states in question and
in the District of Columbia under the ‘medical’ cannabis schemes fall far short of
the requirements set forth in articles 23 and 28 of the 1961 Convention as amended
by the 1972 protocol.”).
182. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, on
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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marijuana from benefitting criminals.183 In addition, the DOJ and the
Treasury Department have released guidelines for banks to legally
provide financial services to legal marijuana retailers184 and the U.S.
House of Representatives has voted to stop the federal government
from interfering with state medical marijuana programs.185 The INCB
responded to the new DOJ memorandum in its 2013 report by simply
noting that “[t]he Board wishes to reiterate that the 1961 Convention
limits the use of cannabis to medical and scientific purposes within
the strict conditions set forth in the Convention”186 and by “urg[ing]
the Government of the United States to continue to ensure the full
implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire
territory.”187
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION
In recent years, the INCB has faced significant hurdles in
enforcing the Single Convention. From Bolivia’s coca leaf
reservation to Uruguay’s legalization of marijuana, the Single
Convention has teetered between respected international law and a
symbolic arrangement lacking a real sense of legitimacy. While the
INCB has arguably done its best to harmonize its statutory
obligations with the reality of 184 countries individually addressing
drug control issues, this balancing act is set to be further challenged
in coming years.
A.

Criticism and Legalization Efforts

Latin America, which has borne the brunt of drug-related
violence, is home to several former and current leaders, in addition to
the presidents of Bolivia and Uruguay, willing to question the Single
Convention’s drug control paradigm. Vicente Fox, former president
of Mexico from 2000 to 2006, has pressed for the legalization of the
production, transit, and sale of all drugs.188 Since 2011, the current

183. Id.
184. Pete Yost, Gov’t Lets Banks, Marijuana Sellers Do Business,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2014, 10:40 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/huff-wires/20140214/us--legalizing-marijuana-banks/.
185. Susan Heavey, U.S. House OKs Plan to Protect State Medical Marijuana
Laws, REUTERS, May 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/30/usapolitics-marijuana-idUSL1N0OG1EU20140530.
186. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 82, at 49.
187. Id. at 96.
188. Ioan Grillo, Mexico’s Ex-President Vincente Fox: Legalize Drugs, TIME
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2040882,00
.html.
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president of Guatemala, Otto Perez Molina, has been calling for
changes to the Single Convention and has lauded legalization
programs, such as those in Washington and Colorado.189 Mexico
decriminalized the possession of small amounts of drugs in 2009,190
and lawmakers in Mexico City are considering using that country’s
system of federalism to decriminalize and regulate marijuana within
the city limits.191 More recently, Mexican President Enrique Peña
Nieto suggested that the national legalization of marijuana should be
considered.192 Lawmakers in Puerto Rico, Chile, Belize, Barbados,
and Trinidad and Tobago are reportedly drafting marijuana
legalization plans.193 Elsewhere, the Moroccan Parliament has
considered legalizing marijuana cultivation,194 and the leader of one
of Canada’s main opposition parties now favors full legalization.195
The Jamaican government announced plans to decriminalize
possession of small amounts of marijuana in June 2014.196
Another former president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, coauthored a report in 2009 with the former president of Brazil
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the former president of Colombia
189. Alfonso Serrano, Guatemala President to UN: Reform Global Drug
Policy, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 26, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://america.aljazeera
.com/articles/2013/9/26/guatemalan-presidentcallsfordrugpolicyreformatungeneral
assembly.html.
190. Ioan Grillo, Mexico’s New Drug Law May Set an Example, TIME (Aug.
26, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1918725,00.html.
191. Ioan Grillo, North America’s Largest City Moves to Legalize Pot, TIME
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/10/14/north-americas-largest-citymoves-to-legalize-pot/.
192. Dave Graham, Mexican President Hints May be Open to Change in
Marijuana Laws, REUTERS, June 8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/0
8/us-mexico-drugs-idUSKBN0EJ0UE20140608.
193. Nicholas Casey, Uruguay Legalizes Pot, Recasting Drug War, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 11, 2013, at A13.
194. Souhail Karam, Morocco’s Marijuana Farms May Become Legal,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-08-01/moroccos-marijuana-farms-may-become-legal.
195. Daniel Leblanc & Sunny Dhillon, Trudeau’s Legalization Stand Set to
Revive Debate on Cannabis, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jul. 25, 2013,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/trudeaus-renewed-call-forlegalized-marijuana-sparks-backlash-from-conservatives/article13426993/.
196.
Horace Helps, Jamaica to Decriminalize Personal Marijuana
Possession, REUTERS, June 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/13/us
-usa-jamaica-marijuana-idUSKBN0EO00120140613.
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César Gaviria in which they identified the war on drugs and
prohibitionist policies as failures.197 They also joined another report
in 2011 that called for the legalization of some drugs.198 The former
presidents were joined on that report by former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz,
former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, former Federal Reserve
chief Paul Volcker, and former Swiss President Ruth Dreifuss,
among others.199 The call for legalization was reiterated in a similar
2013 report arguing that the war on drugs has failed to reduce the
supply or use of drugs, and has instead contributed to HIV and
hepatitis pandemics.200 Likewise a 2014 report issued by the West
African Commission on Drugs, which is chaired by a former
Nigerian president and is comprised of several other former West
African leaders, called for the “decriminalization of drug use and
low-level non-violent drug offences.”201
At the same time that the Single Convention has come under
increasing elite criticism, it seems poised to be further undermined by
one of its most fervent champions: the United States. Specifically,
several states are likely to follow Colorado and Washington in
enacting state-level marijuana legalization programs. Alaska will
hold a referendum on marijuana legalization in August of 2014,202
and recent polling has found over 50 percent support for the

197. Fernando Henrique Cardoso et al., Op-Ed., The War on Drugs Is a
Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A15.
198. Global War on Drugs ‘Has Failed’ Say Former Leaders, BBC NEWS
(June 2, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13624303; GLOBAL
COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS ON
PUBLIC HEALTH: THE HIDDEN HEPATITIS C EPIDEMIC (2013), available at
http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/hepatitis/gcdp_hepatitis_english.pdf.
199. GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, supra note 198; Sara Miller Llana,
Kofi Annan, George Schultz Say Drug War a Failure, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (June 3, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/0603/
Kofi-Annan-George-Shultz-say-drug-war-a-failure.
200. Specifically, the 2013 report included a reprinted copy of the
Commission’s 2011 recommendation to “[e]ncourage experimentation by
governments with models of legal regulation of drugs. . . .” GLOBAL COMM’N ON
DRUG POLICY, supra note 198.
201. WEST AFRICAN COMM’N ON DRUGS, NOT JUST IN TRANSIT: DRUGS, THE
STATE AND SOCIETY IN WEST AFRICA 56 (2014), available at http://www.wacommi
ssionondrugs.org/WACD_report_June_2014_english.pdf.
202. William M. Welch, Alaska Moves Toward August Vote on Legal Pot,
USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02
/04/alaska-marijuana-ballot/5210613/.
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measure.203 Efforts are also under way to gather signatures for
legalization ballot initiatives in Oregon204 and the District of
Columbia.205 Advocates in California will attempt to put a
legalization question on the ballot in America’s most populous state
in 2016.206 Although voters rejected a similar initiative in 2010, a
recent poll put support for legalization at 60 percent.207
Commentators have pointed to Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nevada, and Vermont as other states likely to legalize
marijuana soon,208 while public polling has found majority support
for legalization in others states, including Maryland209 and New
York.210
Moreover, on a national level, Americans have increasingly
turned away from marijuana prohibition. In 2011, Gallup found that
203. Alaska Miscellany, PUB. POL’Y POLLING (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2014/02/alaska-miscellany.html#more.
204. Jeff Mapes, With National Backing, Marijuana Advocates File
Legalization Measure, OREGONIAN, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/ma
pes/index.ssf/2013/10/with_national_backing_marijuan.html.
205. Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Elections Board Allows Marijuana Legalization
Effort to Move Forward, WASH. POST, March 11, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/dc-politics/dc-elections-board-allows-marijuana-legalization-effort-to-moveforward/2014/03/11/7821db7c-a402-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html.
206. Maria L. La Ganga, California Ballot Measure on Pot Legalization
Delayed Until 2016, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la
-na-pot-measure-20140218,0,3213398.story#axzz2tdEtCRUG.
207. Lydia O’Connor, Most Californians Support Marijuana Legalization,
Says Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:05 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpo
st.com/2013/09/27/california-marijuana-legalization_n_4005646.html.
208. See, e.g., id. (listing states where marijuana legislation is being or has
been considered); Fabien Tepper, Colorado Marijuana Sales: Long Lines for
Smooth Rollout of Legal Business, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2014/0102/Colorado-marijuanasales-Long-lines-for-smooth-rollout-of-legal-business (indicating several states that
could consider marijuana ballot measures by 2016).
209. Maryland Survey Results, PUB. POL’Y POLLING (Sept. 29, 2013),
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/Maryland-Poll-Results.pdf
(showing support at sixty-eight percent).
210. Press Release, Quinnipac Univ. Polling Inst., New York Voters Back
Medical Marijuana 10-1, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Strong Support for
Recreational
Marijuana
Also
(Feb.
17,
2014),
available
at
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/ny/ny02172014_b1s5tv.pdf/ (indicating
that fifty-seven percent of New York residents support the legalization of small
amounts of marijuana).
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50 percent of Americans favored legalization.211 By 2013, support
had climbed to 58 percent,212 while a Pew survey found 52 percent in
favor of legalization.213 A CNN poll in early 2014 found support for
legal marijuana sales standing at 54 percent, and support for
legalizing the use of marijuana at 55 percent.214 In addition, a 2012
Gallup poll found that 64 percent of American adults thought that the
federal government should not take steps to enforce federal marijuana
laws in states where it has been legalized.215 In light of these
developments, it is now evident that the question is not whether other
states will legalize marijuana, but rather what state will do it next.
B.

A Choice Between Possible Failure and Probable Failure

The current drug control policy dynamics make clear that the
Single Convention and the INCB are fighting a losing war. The
international trend is unquestionably toward more lenient approaches
to at least some drugs, particularly marijuana. As such, supporters of
the Single Convention are stuck between two unpleasant options.
First, they could continue to stand by the current Convention in an
attempt to stop further legalization efforts, but that would risk failure
and possible irrelevancy for the treaty. On the other hand, supporters
could cede partial defeat, most likely in the form of accepting some
marijuana legalization, which could theoretically open the door to
further attacks against the Single Convention’s provisions. For
supporters of the Single Convention, this may feel like being stuck
between a rock and a hard place. But when viewed objectively it is
far more equivalent to choosing between defeat and a tactical retreat.
Neither approach is a sure success, but the current model under
the Single Convention is simply untenable. The INCB has relied
exclusively on “naming and shaming” offending countries, to little
211. Frank Newport, Record-High 50% of Americans Favor Legalizing
Marijuana Use, GALLUP (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150149/Reco
rd-High-Americans-Favor-Legalizing-Marijuana.aspx.
212. Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana,
GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americansfavor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx.
213. Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE
PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/majo
rity-now-supports-legalizing-marijuana/.
214. CNN|ORC Poll, CNN (Jan. 6, 2014), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2014/i
mages/01/06/cnn.orc.poll.marijuana.pdf.
215. Frank Newport, Americans Want Federal Gov’t out of State Marijuana
Laws, GALLUP (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159152/americansfederal-gov-state-marijuana-laws.aspx.
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avail.216 Its only other option would be to recommend a drug
embargo,217 but its success, and even acceptance, would be highly
uncertain, particularly in cases with the United States or when the
violation involves less stigmatized substances, such as marijuana. As
such, the INCB’s current approach results in options that would do
little more than make the INCB and the Single Convention appear
ineffective and meaningless.
Stuck in this losing situation, supporters of the Single
Convention, if they want to maintain some semblance of the current
drug regime, should cede the battle in an attempt to salvage the war.
Its supporters should be open to amendments for the legal regulation
of certain substances and to permit greater flexibility on the domestic
level. Specifically, they should use the experience with Bolivia as a
rough template whereby a new protocol, reservations, or amendments
can be used as a safety valve for national reform movements.
Bolivia legalized the use of coca leaves prior to any adjustments
in its relation to the Single Convention. Its actions were in obvious
contravention of the treaty, but the government was clearly not
deterred by that reality. Indeed, the only real question in relation to
the coca leaf legalization effort was whether Bolivia would be
allowed to re-adhere and comply with the rest of the treaty or be
removed completely from the agreement. A strict approach to the
Single Convention would have undoubtedly led to the latter of these
scenarios, if not an attempted embargo, while the former, which did
occur, struck a balance between respecting Bolivians’ historical use
of the coca leaf with the international obligation of preventing the
production, transportation, and possession of processed cocaine. In
this way, the new reservation served as a safety valve allowing for
the use of coca leaves, while cutting off momentum for any further
contempt or efforts against the Single Convention.
A comparable, ideally standardized, approach to marijuana for
countries such as Uruguay would serve a similarly appropriate
purpose. Namely, countries desiring to reform their drug laws would
be effectively permitted to do so, while being required to enforce the
rest of the Single Convention. This would sanction, without
endorsing, reforms that would take place regardless of the treaty, as

216. INT’L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, supra note 71, at 3.
217. Id.
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witnessed in Bolivia, Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington, while
respecting the remainder and overarching purpose of the Single
Convention. Although hardly ideal for supporters of the treaty, the
alternative would likely result in countries leaving the Single
Convention as a whole, or, as now appears to be the case, remaining
party to the agreement while flagrantly disregarding portions of their
obligations.
This paper’s suggested reforms would be best accomplished
through the adoption of a protocol allowing for some of the Single
Convention’s strictly prohibition-based requirements to be replaced
with specific goal-based obligations. Those goals could include
reducing drug-related violence, levels of addiction, and criminal
trafficking, and individual countries would be free to choose their
own means for reaching them. Such a protocol would create the
opportunity for countries to attempt to address these serious problems
through avenues other than prohibition and criminal sanctions,
including decriminalization or legalization. The protocol could be
limited to specific substances, such as marijuana, without removing
all of the Single Convention’s prohibition-based requirements.
Moreover, it would have the benefit of allowing for experimentation
in some countries, while allowing others to maintain the strictly
prohibitory policies found in the Single Convention.218 This
flexibility would be preferable over a full amendment changing the
requirements for all parties, as well as the re-adherence strategy
followed by Bolivia, which is open to more abuse and inconsistency.
However, regardless of the method, allowing for more
flexibility on the national level would not compel total abandonment
of the Single Convention. Rather, it would require the courage to say
that times have changed, and that our international drug policies need
to adapt accordingly. Such a shift would not only bolster the INCB’s
credibility and protect the Single Convention from sustained attacks
of rigidity and irrelevance, but also could lead to more effective and
humane solutions to the problems associated with drug trafficking
and abuse.

218. Protocols, as opposed to amendments, need not be adopted by every party
to the original treaty. Instead, some parties may adopt the new protocol and its
obligations, while other member states do not adhere and remain bound solely by
the original agreement. See David Favre, An International Treaty for Animal
Welfare, 18 ANIMAL L. 237, 254–55 (2012) (discussing the nature of role of
protocols as compared to traditional treaties); see, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303
U.N.T.S. 148 (1998).
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CONCLUSION
This paper does not call for a total revamp of the Single
Convention. It does not even call for the removal from international
control of any substances, although such a change may be necessary
in coming years. Instead, what it does suggest is that supporters of the
Single Convention recognize the current trends in the drug reform
movement. In doing so, they should use the example of Bolivia and
coca leaves as a basic, if procedurally imperfect, template for how to
address changing cultural norms and policies. A new protocol or a
new process for creating reservations or amendments for some use of
certain substances would be a historic step, but would be no more
radical than recognizing what is already occurring and likely to
continue occurring under the current system and the INCB’s watch.
In making this recommendation, it should be emphasized that
this suggestion is not based on ideology or animosity, but rather in
the unmistakable evidence that international drug prohibition has not
accomplished its goals, and that further forms of legalization appear
all but inevitable. The INCB and other international actors have been
unable to address the global drug problem in terms of use or
trafficking. As an outgrowth of this failure, the INCB has also been
unable stop member states from experimenting with alternatives to
prohibition, including drug decriminalization and legalization.
Continued inflexibility will not change this outcome, but would
rather undermine the Single Convention, and international law in
general. Accordingly, it would be in the best interest of the Single
Convention’s supporters to create a new protocol allowing for limited
reforms along the lines of those taking place in Bolivia, Uruguay, the
United States, and other countries. Accepting this recommendation
will require serious concessions, but failure to recognize the changing
status of drug reform bears much greater risks. Many policymakers
and members of the public have already appreciated this shift, and
change is coming, and will continue to come, with or without the
Single Convention. With the weight of elite criticism and public
opinion building, the only question now is whether the Single
Convention’s supporters think it is better for that treaty to bend, or to
break.

